The facts and myths about Arctic shipping

The idea the Arctic is a hotbed for emerging risks is a “total exaggeration”, according to Captain David (Duke) Snider, the chief executive of Martech Polar Consulting.

“The same risks exist today as 10 years ago in many ways, and I do not see geopolitical tensions adding to the mix significantly, regardless of what many pundits and armchair security experts feel,” Snider tells Insurance Day.

“As climate change advances and ice gradually retreats, the Arctic routes will become more viable for vessels other than icebreakers and high ice-class ships. We are clearly seeing incremental increases in shipping already,” he adds.

A former president of The Nautical Institute, Snider says re/insurers must consider that climate change is leading to greater variability in ice conditions and that a “good ice year” does not mean ice free.

“Whereas historically, multi-year pack ice, ice walls or ice bridges typically held the heavier ice back, this is no longer the case. We are seeing more dangerous multi-year ice in waters where typically it was never encountered, such as the southern portions of the Northwest Passage,” he explains.

Arctic mariners are also seeing glacial ice – “icebergs, bergy bits and growlers” – in areas that were previously totally free of it. As climate change has reduced the extent of the polar multi-year pack, glaciers are now “calving off bergs”, Snider says, and these ice features are now “free to drift” into new areas that were previously ice free.

“In the last several years, we have encountered glacial ice in the Beaufort Sea when we never did in the past,” Snider stresses, adding the increased variability in ice conditions, brought about by climate change, means the start and end of a navigational season are no longer clear cut.

Although the navigational season is thus lengthening, conditions within the season can vary.

“We continue to see ice blockages that only high ice-class vessels can deal with,” Snider says. “The major climate models indicate we will first see the trans-Arctic route – across the top – open more regularly.  The Northern Sea Route will progressively open next and finally the Northwest Passage will be the last to be regularly open – as long as there is ice, it will be pushed against and into the Canadian archipelago.”

An icebreaker in Lancaster Sound, Northwest Passage Sabena Jane Blackbird/Alamy Stock Photo

The result is that Arctic voyages will continue to be affected by ice, interfering with passages, either by delaying, diverting or even precluding successful passage for any but ice-class vessels.

Snider explains that liner traffic requires consistent speeds for scheduled port departures and arrivals, and such traffic cannot be operated economically if any ice variability would negatively affect schedules. That traffic must therefore operate expecting delays, diversions or cancellations, he adds.

There will be a continued incremental increase in destinational shipping, he continues, meaning there will be journeys into and out of the Arctic either to resupply communities or export natural resources, but through-traffic will not increase as much because routing and voyage completion “cannot be consistently assured”.

“The much-vaunted savings in fuel by taking an Arctic ‘short cut’ are normally never realised as ships often use more fuel diverting or taking longer than planned,” Snider says. Moreover, protection and indemnity and hull and machinery insurance rates increase “dramatically” when operating in the Arctic, he adds, because of the higher costs of building, maintaining, operating and crewing to meet ice conditions.

Although Snider does not expect short-cut shipping and transits to increase as markedly as some might think, he believes that, as traffic does increase, there will be an increase in environmental and cultural impacts, both negative and positive.

“Tourism in particular, with its inherent need to do more than just look from afar, and instead to go ashore into either environmentally or culturally sensitive areas, will potentially give rise to greater negative impact,” he says.

On the economic competitiveness of Arctic routes over traditional shipping routes, Snider says that, apart from specific cargoes not on liner schedules, the so-called short-cut routes are not economically better than sub-arctic routing.

“We will continue to see increased traffic for resupply and resource export,” he says, adding running tankers or container ships through the Arctic will not reap the rewards expected.

At present, the route over the North Pole is not “routinely achievable”, other than by icebreakers but, as climate change advances, this will likely become the most viable cross-Arctic route, Snider says. However, current ice conditions make estimating the time needed to complete such a voyage “rather disingenuous”, he adds.

Seven routes

There are generally seven routes through the Northwest Passage, the most traditional of which is the southern route – Lancaster Sound, Peel Sound, Victoria Strait, Dolphin and Union, and Coronation Gulf to Amundsen Gulf. Snider says this route is the least ice-impacted but it is draught-limited. Peel Sound, however, can be choked with ice.

The other six are offshoots of the southern route:

• Lancaster Sound, Prince Regent, Bellot Strait, Peel Sound, Victoria Strait and onwards;

• Bellot Strait Peel sound, James Ross Strait, Simpson Strait, Dolphin and Union then onwards;

• Hudson Bay, Fury and Hecla Strait, Prince Regent Sound, Bellot Straight and then either east or west of King William Island to Dolphin and Union and onwards;

• Lancaster Sound to Viscount Melville Sound and then north of Banks Island;

• Lancaster Sound, Viscount Melville Sound and Prince of Wales Strait to Amundsen; and

• Lancaster Sound, Mclintock Strait, Victoria Strait, Dolphin and Union, and onwards

The Northwest Passage plays host only to the “usual players” or expeditionary mariners because of a lack of local infrastructure in this remote area that has small villages and no real port, fuel, resupply or repair facilities between Nuuk and Dutch Harbor, Snider says.

The Northern Sea Route has a higher population density than the Northwest Passage – of up 10,000 people in some areas – and more developed infrastructure west from Norway to Novaya Zemlya in Russia. There have been extensive oil and gas projects in the western Northern Sea Route, along with a heavy commitment to provide icebreakers. The navigation challenge is around “complex bureaucracy”, Snider says.

Although Russia is “aggressively” building search and rescue infrastructure in the Arctic region, no similar effort is being made by other Arctic coastal states, Snider says. Emergency support is limited to the US Coast Guard’s Arctic Shield, while Canada “does not preposition air assets”, he adds.

Operation Arctic Shield is aimed at projecting US Coast Guard presence into remote areas that remain icebound for around half the year, and are known for their harsh climate and lack of infrastructure.

Training for polar waters

Snider says the Polar Code has provided the first international mandatory set of requirements for ship construction and operation in polar waters but, by necessity, it is a “lowest common denominator”.

“Much of Canada’s own demonstrative regulatory requirements developed over decades were sadly downgraded to meet the Polar Code instead of maintaining our higher standards,” he says.

The Polar Code has been effective, however, in requiring higher standards in many areas of shipboard equipment, for example, but it has “dropped the bar” on experiential requirements for bridge officer training and certification.

Snider stresses that a Certificate of Proficiency for polar waters is not equal to The Nautical Institute’s Ice Navigator qualification. If ice is expected, ice experience should be mandatory, he says, and there ought to be an experienced and certified ice navigator onboard. For this, he points to The Swedish Club’s advice for trading in the polar regions, that an ice pilot should be onboard assisting the crew.

The Nautical Institute’s ice navigator training and certification scheme “fills the gap in competency” left by Polar Code provisions, Snider says. This scheme mirrors the training provided, for example, by STCW (Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping). This includes specific in-ice sea time requirements and some additional ice operations elements.

“Technically, ships operating in polar waters must now hold Polar Ship Certificates that are meant to ensure the vessel meets the Polar Code’s requirements, but not all flag states or class societies place the same rigour on inspection and verification of requirements before issuing a certificate,” Snider says.

Moreover, to qualify for a Certificate of Proficiency in Basic Training for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, a mariner can gain the required number of sea days in polar waters and “never see ice”.

Operators have often been “taking the easy route”, Snider says, by expecting their “ice navigators” to have only the basic, regulatory requirements, and their officers to have the mandatory Certificate of Proficiency for ships in polar waters. “Canada must once again require someone on the bridge to have an Ice Navigator Certificate Level 2 issued by The Nautical Institute,” he adds.

Quality of charts

Russia operates more than six nuclear-powered and more than six conventionally powered icebreakers. The US has only two operationally capable polar icebreakers, but is building two, possibly three, Polar Security Cutters, Snider says. Canada has committed to build up to six icebreakers, but its order of two polar icebreakers has been “indefinitely delayed”, he adds.

On the quality of Arctic Ocean charts, Snider says Russia and Canada have both been gradually increasing their coverage to modern standards. The challenge with charting, he continues, is that adjoining paper charts may have different data, with some survey data used still dating to the 1800s. “There are sporadic soundings in some areas and track-line soundings in many areas,” he adds.

“In general, the routes that have been historically followed and have been required to meet resupply and general transit are up to modern standards in well surveyed corridors. Outside these corridors, surveys may not exist at all,” he says. About 10% to 15% of the Canadian Arctic waterways are surveyed to modern standards and, for the most part, that is sufficient, he adds.

“Much of the Canadian archipelago is outside of the waters that shipping wants or needs to go. Only tourist vessels really want to go outside these corridors. If new resource extraction projects require additional areas to be surveyed, they can continue to be met by ‘user pays’ as we have relied on in the past,” Snider explains.

“Much of the Canadian archipelago is outside of the waters that shipping wants or needs to go. Only tourist vessels really want to go outside these corridors. If new resource extraction projects require additional areas to be surveyed, they can continue to be met by ‘user pays’ as we have relied on in the past”

^{Captain David Snider
Martech Polar}

As an example, he points to the intense surveys done on the routes into and out of Milne Inlet to facilitate the safe passage of Baffinland mine resupply and export. There remain a few gaps in up-to-date electronic navigation chart coverage, but the Canadian Hydrographic Service is “rapidly closing those gaps”, he adds.

A “zealous” focus on environmental protection gives little leeway to ship operations and “without some latitude and trust”, the cost of shipping will increase substantially, which will inevitably be passed on to the consumer, Snider says.

“Far too often, regulations are being very quickly put in place without broad science-based rationale. I have seen regulations based on one-sided environmental ‘reports’ done by special interest groups that cite dubious input sources. We must get better at doing the science objectively and making balanced decisions,” he stresses.

Communication challenges may be overcome by the launch in May of a combined VSAT, LEO and LTE managed connectivity service by British satellite telecommunications company Inmarsat.

The Iridium satellite constellation – which provides L-band voice and data information coverage to satellite phones, satellite messenger communication devices and integrated transceivers – is “available but slower” than Inmarsat, Snider says. Global Maritime Distress and Safety System’s SAT-C or high-frequency, moreover, are often used as “fall back”, he adds, while SpaceX Starlink has the “most promising future capability”.

It is a myth, Snider says, that the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route are becoming Arctic highways. The reality is that transits of either passage are not increasing at a high rate relative to global shipping traffic and many voyages remain expeditionary, he says. Destinational traffic is increasing though, and includes hydrocarbon exploration, development and export. Community resupply maintains steady to low growth in both Russia and Canada, he says.